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“An Orgy of Licence?” Democracy and Property Redistribution in Poland 
and the Baltics in Their International Context, 1918 - 1926 
 
Abstract 
 
The article argues that property redistribution was a major tool of democratisation and 
nationalisation in Poland and the Baltics. It provided governments with a means to give 
peasants a stake in the new democratic states, thus empower the new titular nations and at the 
same time marginalise former elites, who became national minorities. The most significant 
acts of property redistribution were the land reforms passed between 1919 and 1925, which 
achieved the status of founding charters of the new states. Activists of the disenfranchised 
minorities conceptualised minority protection as the “magna carta” of the international order, 
which should contain the principle of national self-determination and thus safeguard private 
property, the protection of which was not clearly regulated by international law. By 
examining the contingencies of the aftermath of the war in East Central Europe as well as 
discussions about changing conceptions of property ownership in both East Central and 
Western Europe, the article shows that land reform was meant to counter Bolshevism, but at 
the same time created the impression abroad that the new states themselves displayed 
revolutionary tendencies and did not respect private property – an image that became a 
significant argument of interwar territorial revisionists. 
 
 
Keywords: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, democracy, agrarian reform, property 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The construction of nation states from the former imperial peripheries in East Central Europe 
was accompanied by sweeping processes of property redistribution in the form of liquidation 
of state-owned property and of expropriation of land. All according bills were passed by 
democratically elected parliaments – in some cases, like Estonia, as early as 1919, while the 
state was still in the process of consolidation, and in the case of Poland only one year before 
the switch to authoritarianism in 1926. This article examines the land reforms of the 
independent states emerging from the western periphery of the collapsed Russian Empire – 
Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – in their national and international contexts of 
democratisation. 
  
There is an extensive historiography on property redistribution – particularly on land reforms 
– in East Central Europe, which, however, tends to be nationally fragmented (e.g. Lipping; 
Maldutis; Markowski; Mertelsmann/Mertelsmann; for comparative studies cf. e.g. 
Roszkowski; Vaskela; Deacon). The region under discussion is particularly fruitful in this 
regard, as it encompasses the most radical of the East Central European land reforms 
(Baltics) and one of the most moderate (Poland). The aims of land redistribution were closely 
related to state and nation building and can be divided into short and long-term objectives. In 
1919/20, the new states promised peasants land to counter Bolshevik influence (Minnik 37-
39). In the medium-term, land reforms should help integrate the components of the new 
national territories, which often had different systems of land tenure, for instance the Polish 
partition areas, the Petseri region in Estonia, Latvian Latgale or Romanian Bessarabia 
(Maandi). The long-term aim was the empowerment of the peasantry as core of the titular 
nation at the expense of national minorities and particularly of a landowning nobility 
increasingly perceived as “foreign”, such as Baltic Germans and Poles but also, for instance, 
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Muslims in Bosnia, Hungarians in the Banat, and Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia 
(Blomqvist; Cornwall; Giordano; Giordano/Kempinski; Stanulewicz; Kłusek). 
 
While national historiographies and economic history have focused on economic aims of 
agrarian reforms (Norkus; Kaur; Gilly) and their failure (Aldcroft; Eellend), this article 
suggests that economic rationalisation was less a driving factor than nationalisation. 
However, nationalisation cannot be examined in isolation from a broader transformation of 
the relationship of democracy and property. While this nexus has been largely ignored by 
recent historiography, Italian agronomist Olindo Gorni (223-23) highlighted it as early in 
1931, arguing that the East Central European land reforms represented the last phase of a 
process of peasant empowerment starting with the French Revolution, after which all major 
historical events resulted in a political strengthening of the European peasantry, such as the 
the 1848 Revolutions, the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese war. Nonetheless, the liaison 
between democratic statehood and private property was highly ambiguous before the First 
World War. The notion of democracies as guardians of private property is a result of the 
rather recent amalgamation of democracy and capitalism into post-World War II “liberal 
democracy”. The revolutionary character of democratisation, its push for fundamental social 
change and extension of franchise were for the longest part of history rather seen as a threat 
to existing patterns of private property (Halbac 57; Horn 109). However, the creation of 
private property and its connection to the individual was considered crucial for the 
sustainment of democracy. French revolutionaries saw smallholdings as a crucial guarantor of 
liberty (Barbu 34-35). In his seminal work Democracy in America (1835), Tocqueville 
claimed agriculture and especially smallholdings were vital for a tenable democracy, as they 
tied land to labour and thus heightened the moral and political benefits of individual integrity 
and autonomy – the prerequisites for personal liberty (Drolet 108-9). 
 
These two notions – to restructure land tenure to accommodate an extension of political 
participation and to tie land to individual labour and thus populace to democratic statehood 
(making it less susceptible to alternative forms of statehood) – grew in strength with the 
democratisation of methods of government caused by the First World War (Reynolds 41-84). 
In interwar East Central Europe, agrarianist ideas and property-structure reforms, often seen 
as a “third way” between capitalism and socialism, were specifically linked to imperial 
collapse, but they also shared features with broader processes. If we look, for instance, at the 
concept of a “property-owning democracy” as formulated by British conservative Noel 
Skelton in 1923, which aimed at a redistribution of property into smallholdings under 
conservative guidance, we find striking similarities to agrarianist discourse in East Central 
Europe: Land had to be parcelled and distributed to the newly enfranchised but impoverished 
masses to protect them from revolutionary ideology.i The creation of an agrarian structure 
based on smallholding should give the peasantry a stake in a democratic political system, 
making them less susceptible to a growing political left. While Skelton meant the Labour 
Party, which had emerged as the main political opposition from the war, promises for 
redistribution of land in East Central Europe countered Bolshevik propaganda spread in the 
context of continuing warfare in 1918 – 1921. Notably, US pressure on “friendly states” 
during the early Cold War to push for land reform was also grounded in strategies to counter 
communist influence (Federico 172). At the same time, the specifics of “propertisation” in 
East Central and South Eastern Europe, i.e. restrictions of property rights, which led towards 
an “ethno-national concept of property”, as observed  by Siegrist and Müller (8), may be 
contextualised in broader European trends towards autarky and a restriction of division and 
sale of farmland to avoid fragmentation, as introduced in the Netherlands in 1924 and 
culminating in Nazi Germany’s “Land Heritage Law” (Reichserbhofgesetz) of 1933. 
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The paper thus aims to answer the following questions: What role did property redistribution 
play in the building of democratic nation states in Poland and the Baltics? How did 
representatives of the emerging nation states tie their programs of property redistribution to 
the new systems of parliamentary rule? How far did those affected by expropriation and 
confiscation refer to democratic arguments to make their cases? Finally: What can East 
Central Europe tell us about broader changes in the understanding of the relationship of 
democracy and property in early 20th century Europe? Answering these questions allows us to 
draw conclusions concerning the post-1918 key categories of statehood and international 
order, such as self-determination, minority protection, revolution and reform, and their 
relationship to the nation state. 
 
In East Central Europe, democracy was imposed from above and, because of the agricultural 
character of these new states, gave peasants an immediate political weight that no party could 
ignore. At the same time, disenfranchised minorities, who had little chance to resist processes 
of expropriation within the new nation states, were provided with international institutions 
and a framework of international law (most importantly minority protection) to make their 
cases (Raitz von Frentz; Niendorf). Those groups most effected by the expropriation and 
confiscation– members of the Polish nobility, who were expropriated in Lithuania, Latvia and 
Romania, and different groups of German-speaking landowners in Poland and the Baltics – 
relied on foreign legations and the League of Nations to argue against the legitimacy of the 
reforms. 
 
 
II. National Policies and International Pressures 
 
Understanding the role of property redistribution in the building of democratic nation states 
in East Central Europe requires an examination of domestic policies within the contingent 
constellations of the post-1918 period. The 1919 debates in the Estonian Provincial Assembly 
(Maapäev) and Constituent Assembly (Asutav Kogu) provide us with particular insight, as the 
Estonian land reform was of a particularly sweeping scale and passed with astonishing speed. 
Here, land distribution was particularly disparate, with more than two thirds of the Estonian-
speaking peasants owning no land and 58 % of all land being in the hands of the Baltic 
German nobility (Jörgensen). The relationship between landowners and peasants had 
worsened considerably with the Revolution of 1905 and the German occupation in early 1918 
(Raun; Minnik). The first draft of the Estonian land bill was read to the assembly as early as 
22 November 1918. It was thus very closely tied to initial stages of state building on the one 
hand and to the military struggle against groups hostile to Estonian independence on the 
other. With socialist revolutions gaining momentum in Europe and the Western Entente 
preparing peace negotiations for a democratically determined world order, the future of the 
western peripheries of the collapsed Russian Empire was as of yet unresolved, making it 
difficult to predict for state builders whether their new states would have to come to terms 
with capitalist or socialist neighbours in the future. Estonia was currently wedged between 
two great socialist powers – Russia and Germany – and should thus consider itself a turn to 
socialism, Estonian Social Democrats and Labour-Party (Tööerakond) activists argued.ii 
Social democrat Johan Jans, one of the most vocal advocates for the nationalisation of land, 
argued that the feudal order had to be abolished “before the reaction takes over in Europe.”iii 
Opponents, particularly the Rural League (Maaliit) argued that this would significantly 
tarnish Estonia’s image abroad – the institutions of the young republic had to show they were 
based on democratic principles and respect for private property.iv 
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In the months to follow, the Western Entente continued to promote a united Russia including 
the Baltics. White Guards, Freikorps and Baltic German troops occupied large parts of the 
region, and Bolshevik activists gained influence among the peasantry, putting the new 
republic under considerable pressure. The most contentious points remained the question of 
the relationship between state and property on the one hand and the method of expropriation 
on the other. Social democrats argued the state should assume a strong role in the 
development of agriculture, abolish private property, nationalize the large estates and 
maintain their integrity to ensure their international competitiveness in the hands of rural 
cooperatives. On the other hand, conservative nationalists around Jaan Tõnisson’s People’s 
Party (Rahvaerakond) and the Labour Party advocated a gradual parcellation of Baltic 
German large estates into economically feasible, privately owned smallholdings.v This would 
give the peasantry a stake in the Republic and prove to the Entente that Estonia distanced 
itself from Bolshevism.vi 
 
The latter proposal prevailed as a basis for the land bill, making its broad strokes strikingly 
similar to international discussions on agrarian reform. What made the Estonian reform 
radical in the eyes of many was what followed the escalation of the conflict between Baltic 
Germans and Estonians, culminating in Estonian military victory over the Baltische 
Landeswehr at Cēsis in June 1919. In a passionate speech to the Constituent Assembly, Jans 
argued that the Baltic German nobility had threatened Estonian statehood and thus become 
“strangers to the people”vii – accordingly, their land should be confiscated without 
compensation. Confiscation, Jans claimed, corrected a historical wrong, appealed to a public 
sense of justice and thus ensured social stability.viii With the improvement of Estonia’s 
military situation and an easing of the Entente’s position towards the breakaway Republics, 
Estonian politicians emphasised their ties to the western democracies. While warning that the 
confiscations must not become an international issue, they sensed that Great Britain and 
France were rather interested in economic stability in the region and would hardly object if 
Estonia confiscated the property of ethnic Germans.ix On October 10, the Constituent 
Assembly passed the land reform bill, thus expropriating the large estates, but postponing the 
decision on the compensation issue. 
 
On the international level, reactions ranged from cautious to entirely negative – not only in 
the case of Estonia, but also concerning the Latvian land reform act, passed in September 
1920, and the laws passed in Lithuanian in 1922 and in Poland in 1920 and 1925. In terms of 
scope, the land reform in Estonia was the most extensive, redistributing 96.6 % of the large-
estate land. In Latvia, where Baltic Germans played a similar role in land ownership as in 
Estonia, 84 % of all land was redistributed, 77 % in Lithuania and only 20 % in Poland 
(Łukasiewicz 313; Tyla 41; von Rauch 87; Ciepielewski 15). Views on the land bills of the 
two northernmost republics were thus harshest, also because the Estonian parliament took 
until 1926 to allow payment of small compensations, and the Latvian parliament ruled in 
1924 that no compensations be paid at all. In 1921, in the notable case of the takeover of the 
struggling Kreenholm cotton factory, Minister of Agriculture Roostfeld warned this would 
cause the impression that Estonia was nationalising its industry, which would impede 
international loans.x Latvian members of the opposition warned the reform could threaten de 
jure recognition of the republic.xi The Christian nationalist newspaper Liepājas Avīze warned 
the reform made foreign loans impossible: “The expropriation and dissolution of large 
estates, which once fed Latvia’s towns and landless and are now suddenly turned into 
desolation, signals to foreigners that private property in Latvia is not safe.”xii Representatives 
of foreign governments protested against a law that allowed the Latvian state to requisition 25 
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% of all imported goods and pay compensation at a later stage, when they had become largely 
devalued due to hyperinflation.xiii In 1924, an Estonian delegation, ordered to London to 
negotiate loans and headed by independence-war hero General Laidoner, was greeted coolly, 
with British politicians claiming they had no confidence in the security of property in 
Estonia.xiv French and British diplomats warned they would not insist on a Soviet guarantee 
of the borders of the Baltic States, unless these resolved their quarrels with the Baltic 
Germans.xv The German government, understandably, reacted most critically, but, being left 
out of the settlement of the European post-war order, could also do the least about it. German 
diplomats recommended that affected Baltic Germans appeal to the kings of Great Britain or 
Romania, hoping that states governed by monarchs protest against this “divestment of this 
ancient ruling caste”xvi. 
 
 
III. Radical Empowerment: Agrarian Reform or Agrarian Revolution? 
 
The Polish land reform was similarly tied to contingencies of early state building, as peasant 
populist Wincenty Witos rallied peasants to help in the defence of Poland during the critical 
phase of the Polish-Soviet War in 1920 by land (interestingly, the Lithuanian government 
used the same point of time of perceived Polish weakness to discuss its own land bill). 
According to Witos’s predecessor as Prime Minister, Władysław Grabski, the necessity for a 
speedy enacting of the land bill in facilitated democratisation, as it forced the government to 
rely on historical forms of local self-rule with the village commune (gromada) – abolished 
after the 1863 Uprising – as main agent for agrarian reform, supported by newly created state 
authorities that resembled Bolshevik Commissars for Agricultural Issues (Grabski 18-19). 
However, the rather far-reaching reform act of 15 July 1920 was followed up with a 
decidedly more moderate land bill that took another five years to be passed. While aiming at 
an expansion of Polish smallholding in the former Prussian partition (at the expense of 
German settlers) while maintaining Polish large estates in the multi-ethnic Eastern regions 
(Blanke 1993; Benecke 1999), the laws placed higher restrictions on forced sales and 
confiscations, allowed for larger farms and provided more robust property titles for new 
farms than in the Baltics. This was in line with the appeal of historian Franciszek Bujak, 
short-term minister of agriculture, who had urged the Polish peasantry to protect the principle 
of private property against Bolshevism and argued that maintaining democracy and private 
property entailed cautious and gradual reform: 
  
“If peasants begin to think about the issue of distribution of land and the management 
of it today, they must come to the conclusion that effective and therefore truly useful 
changes cannot be achieved by an ad hoc revolution from one day to the other, but 
only by well-devised reform (…). But all this must happen within the circle of 
initially established basic premises; otherwise our whole civilization will decline, 
cripple and collapse to the ground. Reforms are different from revolutions in so far as 
they consist of are partial and gradual changes and they apply strict measures aimed at 
the purpose; for this reason they are stable, while revolutions, on the other hand, are 
more violent, less durable, and what remains of them are only unpleasant memories.” 
(Bujak 64-65) 
 
Compared to the Baltics, national empowerment was less at the core of the Polish reform – 
also because most large landowners in Poland were ethnic Poles. As a consequence, 
discussions of the bill revolved largely around the advantages of estates versus smallholding, 
which made the law a more typical representative of previous European democratising 
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reforms of land tenure. Despite the symbolic power Polish nationalism attributed to the large 
estates, Grabski argued that Poland required a more balanced tenure of both large and small 
farms. Not least, the state should facilitate conversion into smallholdings to create 
democratically-minded citizens in the countryside by reducing social envy. For Grabski, the 
link between ownership and citizenship represented the most powerful bond between man 
and state, making parcelling a vital tool of democratisation, as it “increases the number of 
landowners and therefore of citizens of the country, even if they do not feel part of this title 
today – they are still potential citizens for the time being and constitute valuable material for 
the future.” (Grabski 26) 
 
This balance between large farms that bolstered the economy and small farms that supported 
democratization was viewed favourably abroad, giving the Polish land reform a reputation of 
a moderate and well-balanced policy (Giordano 210). However, German experts were highly 
critical, claiming that the restructuring of land tenure would have evolved anyway in the form 
of a “natural evolution” through voluntary sale. The land law, however, was designed to cut 
this development short through forced sales of mainly German-owned land, representing an 
“agrarian revolution decreed by the state itself”, which would cause the international 
financial markets to doubt the Polish economy.xvii Disenfranchised ethnic Germans and their 
supporters in Weimar Germany reversed Bujak’s appeal into the negative, characterising 
property policy in East Central Europe as revolutionary, thus contextualising it firmly in 
Bolshevik agrarian policies of confiscation, nationalisation and collectivisation. Agronomists 
argued that, whereas the progression of civilization went hand in hand with an intensification 
of the sense of property ownership and its legal protection, “agrarian revolutions” violated 
this principle, thus creating semi-states that could not be regarded as equals to the historical 
states of Central and Western Europe (Fromme 2; Krause). Agrarian revolutions thus 
represented an “unnatural” rupture from the evolutionary, organic agrarian development 
fostered by the German landowners (Bürig 33; Schönemann 212-13). German agronomist 
Max Sering noted that the French revolutionaries had only expropriated the enemies of the 
revolution, most often landed gentry living off the rent, whereas the Estonians and Latvians 
had disenfranchised an entire national group that had played a vital role in the modernisation 
of agriculture.xviii He claimed that the construction of democratic states in the former imperial 
peripheries of the Romanov and Habsburg Empires had put political control in the hands of 
an uneducated peasantry, leading to the introduction of confiscation as the primary 
instrument of land acquisition. According to Sering, Latvia and Estonia had in fact abolished 
private property, as the parcelled land handed out to peasants could in turn be confiscated 
anytime, meaning that the agrarian laws differed “from the laws of the Russian Revolution 
only by the virtue of their gutless hypocrisy.” (Sering 15) 
 
To divert fear that the new states of East Central Europe were Bolsheviks behind national 
facades, political activists launched press campaigns, which conceptualised liquidation, 
expropriation and land reforms as crucial components of processes of democratisation. 
Franciszek Bauer Czarnomski, Polish press attaché in London, framed the reform as a 
continuation of historical politics of agricultural modernisation initiated by the Russian and 
German imperial governments. The Bolshevik threat of 1919/20 had demanded hasty 
redistributional policy; however, the final act of 1925 had put Polish agrarian policy back on 
an evolutionary path (Czarnomski 149). Commissioned by the Lithuanian legation in 1919, 
US public-relations expert Edward Bernays framed historical Lithuania as Europe’s oldest 
republic, now reborn as a young democracy and remedying historical injustice by returning to 
a land tenure based on private smallholding. A diaspora writer claimed for the peasantry to 
return to its “pure democratic ideals and customs”xix, the state had to wipe out the dominance 
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of Polish landowners. Latvia, an article placed in the Economist claimed, was protecting itself 
against Bolshevik influence by “establishing a peasant propriety on the estates” and adopting 
“an ultra-democratic Parliamentary constitution.”xx The Times claimed Latvian land would be 
“in time the property of those who work on it.”xxi 
 
Some activists embraced the Agrarrevolution argument, framing it as a legitimate reaction to 
unjust Baltic German misconduct. Notably, Baltic German political activist Axel de Vries 
recounted later that the Estonian countryside had been remarkably calm during the Russian 
Revolution when in inner Russia estate owners were being murdered. Only under German 
occupation, he claimed, had Estonian-Baltic German relations deteriorated to such an extent 
that an agrarian revolution became possible (Vries 14). Estonian press attaché in Finland, 
Georg Eduard Luiga, who repeatedly warned the Constituent Assembly that Estonia’s 
western allies were increasingly anxious about the land reformxxii, denied the German 
consensus of pre-war agrarian evolution versus post-war revolution: “Baltic agrarian history 
is not a proper, steady development on the principles of justice, but an incessant state of war 
between conquerors and subordinated, where the former impose their laws onto the latter 
with force.” (Luiga 5) The land reform had been inevitable, because the peasantry had never 
recognised Baltic German land titles as binding (Luiga/Warep 41). 
 
In a speech to the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) in 1921, foreign minister Juozas Purickis 
placed the “agrarian revolution” in a broader context of Europe-wide changes in property 
norms. Purickis claimed that the law of succession had lost much of its legitimacy in Great 
Britain, Germany and France, having been replaced by labour as the main source of property. 
Accordingly, the principle of the inviolability of property was no longer absolute, but subject 
to processes of democratisation, which had previously rendered serfdom illegitimate as type 
of ownership. The state assumed a crucial role in this transformation – limiting the 
inviolability of property to secure social peace (i.e. foregoing compensation) was thus in line 
with a general historical trajectory of progress. In the form of progressive tax, other European 
states were confiscating from large landowners, too, making East Central Europe a non-
exceptional case. Lithuanian as a democratic nation state had the duty to remove the social 
injustices caused by the Polish-speaking nobility, which owned most of the land and was 
passing it down by succession.xxiii However, capitalist ideology made the western states blind 
to the fact that the new political order in the East was largely congruent with that in the West 
– an ignorance state-builders had to take into account: 
  
“The new concepts (…) slowly penetrate Western conscience, but they do so 
sluggishly and kicking and screaming (…). They will do their best to depict us as 
radical, as not recognising the high standards of Western European law. Our 
resolution will thus cause us no small political economic problems (…). I think we do 
not want follow the capitalist order, but as long as this capitalist order exists, as long 
as capital means power, we have to reckon with this power, and whoever ignores this 
power, will fall (…).”xxiv 
 
Abroad this transformation of norms was perceived as absence of law. German diplomats 
interpreted Purickis’s speech as an attempt to establish supreme ownership of the state over 
its territorial property, which differed from Bolshevik agrarian policies only by the virtue of 
its nationalist motivation.xxv Combined with the alleged intellectual inability of East Central 
European peasants to cope with property ownership and their fear the newly-gained land may 
be confiscated again in the future, these policies placed the Baltic States outside of Europe 
and made them “an advance post of Asia”xxvi, a Romanian-German writer claimed. “Only the 
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power of the strongest has relevance here,”xxvii an expropriated Baltic German landowner in 
Latvia noted. In the new states themselves, peasants complained of arbitrariness concerning 
the implementation of the land reforms, as the new political elites helped themselves to large 
parcels of land, assisted by an erratic bureaucracy (Pruskus 37). In Lithuania, a plaintiff 
argued, members of the Peasant Populist Party (Liaudininkai) were particularly shameless in 
their methods, with one member of parliament receiving additional land in the name of his 
five-year-old child.xxviii In Latvia, president Jānis Čakste came under criticism for allegedly 
having accumulated 330 hectares by shady procedures.xxix Latvian farmers who had received 
parcelled land complained the government was exhausting itself in its rhetoric against 
compensation but did little to improve the life of small peasants and in fact had rather 
replaced the rule of Baltic Germans with a new form of “red landlord” slavery.xxx 
 
Gradually, after the Red Scare subsided, voices abroad began to emphasise the role 
agricultural redistribution policies had played in countering Bolshevik influence. Particularly 
in contrast to South Eastern Europe, where agrarianist parties were closer to communism, the 
agrarian parties of Poland and the Baltics were lauded as “bulwarks of constitutional 
government” (Graham 354). In the late 1920s, a number of German writers increasingly 
described the specifics of East Central Europe less as by-products of Bolshevism, but rather 
as “national democracies” and thus as manifestations of a form of statehood that was bound 
to dominate Europe in the futur  (Richarz 267). In his 1928 book The Spectre of Europe, 
Baltic German philosopher Hermann von Keyserling, who in 1919 had still demanded that 
the British government force Estonia and Latvia to adopt a constitution that explicitly 
rejected Bolshevik policiesxxxi, called the Baltic States “post-Bolshevik”, because the radical 
reforms had helped overcome Bolshevism, and “thus future has consolidated itself there.” 
(Keyserling) 
 
 
IV. Victims of Democratisation? Nobility and Minority Policies 
 
Expansion of democracy and redistribution of land came at the expense of minorities. 
Property redistribution and land reforms thus contributed to processes of nationalisation in a 
two-fold way. Large landowners, who were increasingly seen as foreign in the Baltics, as 
well as German settlers, whom the Polish state conceptualised as agents of Germanisation, 
were expropriated, and their land almost exclusively handed to peasants of the titular nations. 
The new minorities, such as Jews, Belarusians and Ukrainians, went away empty-handed. 
Polish nationalism constructed the mostly Polish-speaking nobility as less at the core of the 
titular nation than the peasantry, but still as part of it (Porter 26). In Latvia and Estonia, 
however, they were seen as national enemies. Latvian activists claimed that in 1917/18 the 
Baltic German nobility had played a crucial role in German plans to annex Courland (Bergs 
80-81). In a personal, extraordinary declaration in June 1919, Estonian prime minister 
Strandman urged the Constituent Assembly to hasten with the land reform, as the Baltic 
German manor owners plotted against the new state.xxxii 
  
In Lithuania, the position of the nobility was more fluid. Most large landowners belonged to a 
Polish-speaking gentry that felt part of a larger, culturally defined Poland, which included 
Lithuania. However, nationalists claimed they were actually polonised Lithuanians, who 
could become useful contributors to nation-state building, once they became aware of their 
ethnic origins. The priest Juozas Tumas-Vaižgantas claimed they were (like all Lithuanians) 
“born democrats” and differed significantly from the Baltic Germans, who had robbed the 
land from the indigenous peasantry. However, Tumas still considered the Lithuanian gentry a 
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threat as a consequence of their loyalty to Poland and their nature as capitalists, meaning they 
had to abstain from political decision-making: “If the nobility dares to determine the fate of 
the whole Lithuanian country with all its inhabitants, it will become more and more alien to 
us, and our relationship with it will worsen, like that of the Latvians and their barons.”xxxiii It 
did indeed worsen with the intensification of the Vilnius crisis, resulting in expropriations 
and expulsions and prompting newspapers to claim that estate owners in all countries were 
anti-democratic.xxxiv With a complete breakdown of diplomatic relations, the Polish state had 
little possibility of providing assistance to Polish-speaking expropriated landowners. With a 
certain sense of satisfaction, the German legation in Kaunas noted that Lithuania was using 
its land reform to “annihilate Polishness.”xxxv This seemed a cause useful enough for 
Germany not to get in the way – a major reason why the legation also chose not to support 
the much smaller group of expropriated German-speaking landowners. 
 
As a result of the congruence of social and ethnic belonging, none of the land reforms had to 
discriminate against ethnic groups explicitly. Foreign observers claimed the new states were 
chasing landowners off their property and legally sanctioned these expropriations in 
retrospectxxxvi – a practice that was indeed common in the contested regions of Poland and the 
Baltics and in fact most of East Central Europe until at least 1921. Minorities rarely received 
confiscated land. Only 6 % of the land redistributed in East Galicia was handed to Ukrainian 
farmers (Giordano 230). Moreover, all four new states made use of wartime displacement by 
declaring Baltic German and Polish large estates, but also smaller farms owned by 
Belarusians and Ukrainians, as abandoned if their owners had been displaced during the war 
(Richter). In Poland, the agrarian law prohibited (specifically for the eastern regions) a lease 
if farmers had abandoned their farms during the war, unless their Polish nationality had been 
the reason for their deportation. xxxvii However, the majority of farmers deported during the 
Russian retreat had been Ukrainians, Belarusians and Germans. In Lithuania, the government 
made a former agricultural occupation a prerequisite for land applications, thus excluding 
Jews, whom the Russian government had banned from living in the countryside. Jews were 
also specifically targeted by the provision that no-one could apply who had been convicted 
for the sale of alcohol in the past.xxxviii When the Ministry for Jewish Affairs was abolished in 
1924, Lithuanian Jews protested vehemently: 
 
“But what is the state to you? For you it is only dear for the matters of your caste. 
What have you given to the state? Have you done anything to teach a single peasant? 
After all he ploughs the earth the same way our ancestors did centuries past. You will 
say: the land reform! But it, too, in your hand became an instrument not of creation, 
but only of destruction (...). You only want the land reform to smash the Poles, as you 
want your economic, national and tax politics to smash the Jews. Your slogan is 
Lithuania for the Lithuanians.”xxxix 
 
Within the new states, minorities had little prospect of re-claiming property. Many thus 
placed their hopes in the League of Nations . In fact, matters of agrarian reform and 
confiscation represented the majority of petitions of German and Polish-speaking minorities 
to the League (Hilpold 114). What made these petitions problematic was the unclear status of 
property protection in international law. Whereas the Treaty of Versailles protected Germans 
in the formerly Prussian part of Poland from expropriationxl, the situation further eastwards 
was largely subject to the international control of minority protection, which did not 
specifically mention the safeguarding of private property at allxli – a circumstance 
contemporary experts of international law considered odd (Loewenfeld 44-5). 
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As the nationalising force of the land reforms was grounded not in the law itself but in its 
implementation, petitioners often failed to identify the discriminatory practice, as Mark 
Cornwall (274) has pointed out regarding Czechoslovakia’s Sudeten Germans. The case of 
Alphonse Heyking, a Baltic German who had served as Russian Consul General in London 
during the War and later became spokesperson of the Association of Latvian Minorities in 
Berlin, shows how protection of property had to be contextualised in a broader framework of 
the powerful ordering principles of self-determination, democracy and minority protection. 
Heyking began petitioning to the League on behalf of expropriated Baltic German 
landowners after the Latvian government dissolved the Corporation of Nobles as an anti-
democratic body on 20 June 1920 and seized its property. Heyking argued that the 
corporation, having been stripped of its political privileges, was now nothing more than a 
private society and no longer contradicted democratic statehood. To no avail, he argued that it 
should be allowed to retain its status as a juridical body (as it had in the Republic of 
Finland).xlii In the British press, Heyking claimed that Latvia violated the rights of its 
minorities by resorting to such an “anti-democratic mode of action.”xliii 
 
According to Heyking, such immoral and unfair policies had been rendered possible by the 
acceptance of the idea of the self-determination of nations, which in East Central Europe had 
been stripped of its Wilsonian democratic essence, as an ordering principle. This principle 
benefitted only those ethnic groups the Western Entente considered allies, thus re-ordering 
Europe according to ethnic hierarchies: “Who shall be on top? Who shall be the hammer, 
who the anvil?”xliv Uneducated and immature peasants, courted by state builders, had 
descended into an “orgy of licence” and “a delirium of envy and ambition”xlv, which made 
the governments prone to experimentation with “risky methods of proletarian rule”.xlvi If 
national self-determination infringed democracy, the League of Nations had to provide the 
corrective. This, in Heyking’s view, made minority protection the strongest democratic 
ordering principle of post-war Europe: a “Magna Carta of humanity”, an international legal 
framework to contain self-determination, the latter of which was based on lawlessness. 
 
To overcome the alleged anti-German bias of the peacemakers and frame the petition as a 
proper minority case, Heyking conceptualised the Baltic Germans as distinct from ethnic 
Germans in former Prussian territories. The so-called Balto-Saxons, Heyking argued, were a 
distinct “racial minority” close to the Anglo-Saxons, constructing a link between “the people 
of these happy islands and those of the severely tried Baltic shores”xlvii. In a lively speech 
given to the British Grotius Society, Heyking took this comparison further: 
 
“Imagine if the Gaelic-Highlanders, the Celts from Wales, Cornwall, and Devon were 
to come down on you and expropriate your landed property, requisition three-quarters 
of London for the benefit of their tribe, and brand you as intruders and foreigners, 
ordering you back to Germany, Denmark, and France (whence you came), since they, 
the Celts, are the original native population of the British Isles! (…) Would you 
submit?” (Heyking 129) 
 
The League of Nations, representing “law, order and peaceful enterprise”, had to contain 
Latvia, which, having succumbed to Bolshevism, represented “methods of plunder and 
force”xlviii and violated the political rights and private ownership of the Balto-Saxons.xlix 
Latvia had to choose between its current system of state administration (“tribalism and ruin”) 
or the superior British one (“racial tolerance and prosperity”). East Central Europe, Heyking 
warned, was not only multi-ethnic, but also in constant demographic flux, with ethnic groups 
resembling “ice-flakes lying in close proximity to each other, or over-lapping each other layer 
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upon layer, brought about by the constant fluctuation and change of peoples through the 
march of time.”l In other words, it made no sense to try to determine who had been there first 
and taken the land from whom – the Latvians or the Balto-Saxons. 
 
With regards to democratic rule in multi-ethnic regions, minority protection was 
quintessential because the minorities, unable to attain parliamentary majorities, could never 
have the same degree of political power as the titular nations. Minorities had to recognise the 
independence and nature of nation states, whereas titular nations had to accept a degree of 
limitation of territorial sovereignty.li Heyking’s pessimistic assessment of the stake minorities 
held in democracies was much in line with that of Ludwig von Mises, who in Nation, State 
and Economy (73-79) had argued that minorities would be willing to resort to desperate 
measures to keep their pre-war privileges, because they would never be able to become a 
majority (and were thus politically unfree) and secondly would be, even if represented 
proportionally, excluded from acts of legislation, administration and jurisprudence. In multi-
ethnic regions, however, Heyking warned ominously, governments in parliamentary systems 
had to be prepared for a change in power, especially in the case of territorial changes. In this 
case, Latvians and Estonians would certainly receive more international support for their own 
rights to citizenship, cultural autonomy and private property if they had themselves 
safeguarded the minority rights in their states.lii 
 
The governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in turn, regarded pressure to sign 
minority-protection treaties, which had originally been introduced for Poland, as an 
infringement of a sovereignty they had eked out for themselves without much support from 
the Western Entente.liii As Poland’s treaty of minority protection included a guarantee of the 
protection of German property, Heyking claimed, a treaty with Estonia and Latvia should 
include the same regulations. Only this could secure the new states a place in the ranks of 
Western European states, which had made the protection of private property a chief objective 
of democracy.liv 
 
Baltic German activists such as Paul Schiemann, who tried to work within the political 
structures of the new Baltic States and were more interested in securing cultural autonomy 
than in fighting the land reforms, considered Heyking’s international petitioning 
confrontative (Hiden 80). However, Heyking appealed to the central categories the League of 
Nations was based on. Other petitioners to the League were less adaptive. A Baltic German 
privy councillor claimed in 1921 that the practice of the new states to legitimise confiscation 
ex-post and the general disregard of property rights posed the threat that “whole 
impoverished nations could gang together and, as proletarians among the nations, menace 
their happier neighbours.”lv A privy councillor of Russian origin claimed that Latvians and 
Estonians had failed to pass the test of maturity: “Children need direction, and the Latvians 
and Estonians are children – and not even sweet-natured ones. If the only fosterage they are 
currently under fails, the same kinds of brawls will happen here as they did on the Balkans, 
where minors were also emancipated much too early.”lvi 
 
 
V. “Social Charters” for Nation States 
 
Whereas Heyking saw minority protection as the „Magna Carta“ of the new international 
order, the new states claimed their land reforms fulfilled this role for nation statehood. The 
land reform, expropriation of the “foreign” nobility and empowerment of the peasantry were 
the major instruments for the building of nation states and for extending sovereignty over 
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national territory. At the founding assembly of the Lithuanian Farmers’ Union (Lietuvių 
ūkininkų sąjunga) in 1920, future president Aleksandras Stulginskis claimed only the 
peasantry was capable of understanding the essence of the Lithuanian state.lvii In 1924, at the 
annual congress of Estonia lawyers, Johan Jans declared that the land reform was 
“organically tied to the emergence of the Republic of Estonia”lviii, and the congress’ 
resolution urged Estonian bar associations to commit themselves to solving any juridical 
issues in relation with the land reform in the favour of Estonia. In 1930, the Latvian Central 
Land Committee and the Parliamentary Agrarian Commission put wreaths at the Military 
Cemetary (Brāļu Kapi) in Riga to pay gratitude “to the fallen freedom fighters for attaining 
the agrarian reform”lix. In an act of defiance to Antanas Smetona’s dictatorship in Lithuania, 
the Popular Peasants Union (Lietuvos valstiečių liaudininkų sąjunga) tied the perished 
democratic Lithuania to the agrarian reform: “Our nation, having attained the right to express 
its will, said very rightfully and seriously: Lithuania is an independent democratic republic 
and owns all of its wealth. The result was the land reform.”lx At a conference of the French 
Committee for Economic and Customs Union (Comité Francais d'Union Économique et 
Douanière Européenne) in 1937, Lithuanian envoy Petras Klimas presented the land reform 
as the founding act of the independent republic, discarding any notions of revolutionary 
action:  
 
“The great agrarian reform, drafted by the Constituent Assembly of 1920–1922, is the 
new social charter that has preserved Lithuania from any influence contrary to its 
lifestyle and its mentality, which is fully committed to the western principles of labour 
and individualistic industry. As in many other countries, the Lithuanian agrarian 
reform was a deeply conservative measure put at the service of the established order 
and private property.”lxi 
 
With regards to the radical character of the reforms, international assessments became more 
moderate over the course of the late 1920s. Sering himself conceded that they had played a 
crucial role in democratisation – although one needs to bear in mind that democracy was not 
an entirely positive term for him (Schmidt 101-2). According to Sering, the agrarian character 
of the borderlands determined the property structure they aspired to: While the push the First 
World War had given to democratic ideals led the populations of industrial regions to claim 
universal property, agrarian regions rather demanded an even distribution of property. In East 
Central Europe, agrarian reform and democratisation had gone hand in hand, leading to the 
establishment of “genuine peasant democracies” (Sering 3), which, however, were marred by 
a high degree of political corruption and failure to find a just agreement with their minorities. 
This in turn determined the way the reforms were implemented.  
 
In 1928, Lithuanian newspapers stated in the case of a petition of Russian repatriates for 
restitution to the League of Nation that Lithuania had relatively little to fear, as Estonia, 
Latvia and Poland were treating minority repatriates much worse.lxii A Baltic German 
newspaper in Latvia also lauded the Lithuanian reform, thus implicitly criticising the Latvian 
one. Democracy and agrarian reform, the author claimed, had convinced the initially 
indifferent peasantry to support Lithuanian independence, which, they hoped, would bring 
them self-determination vis-à-vis their former Polish masters: “Nonetheless, the agrarian 
reform has been implemented here in a much fairer and less rigorous form than in the Baltic 
neighbouring states. Lithuania’s constitution rested on strong democratic foundations.”lxiii 
After compensations payments began in the early 1930s, German newspapers stopped their 
campaigns against Estonia, claiming that its agrarian reform had passed without chicanery, 
distinguishing it from the Latvian “agrarian revolution”, a fact attributed to a lower degree of 
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Jewish and social democratic influence than in Latvia.lxiv However, Latvia remained staunch 
in its resistance against compensation payments. When Baltic German representatives 
claimed in 1930 they would maintain their fight for restitution, Social Democrat Felikss 
Cielens responsed that as long as the Romanov’s were dead, the Kaiser in exile and the Baltic 
German enemies buried at Cēsis, no complaints or appeals could shake the foundations of the 
land reform.lxv The radical version of the agrarian reform had become the conditio sine qua 
non for the existence of the democratic Republic of Latvia. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The relationship of democracy and property redistribution (and resistance to it) in the Baltics 
and Poland cannot be understood without its context in a broader framework of concepts that 
the war had transformed entirely, such as self-determination, minorities and their protection, 
revolution and reform. In the four states under analysis, there is a pronounced contradiction: 
The northernmost state (Estonia) allegedly had the most stable democratic institutions, but 
these enacted the most radical of all European interwar land reforms outside the Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, Poland, which suffered from political instability until Piłsudski’s 
coup in 1926, passed one of the most moderate land bills of the interwar period. Although 
this can be explained by the degree of “foreignness” attributed to the nobility, it still calls the 
nexus of democracy and protection of private property into doubt. Estonian politicians were 
aware of this issue and the repercussions this would have on international relations and the 
Estonian economy. Despite the large amount of land redistributed, as this article showed, up 
until summer 1919 the Estonian concepts for land reform were entirely in line with “western” 
ideas of parcellation into smallholdings to tie peasants to the democratic order – only the 
refusal to pay compensation as a reaction to the involvement of Baltic Germans in military 
forces opposing the young state made the reform appear “radical” or even “revolutionary” in 
the eyes of the disenfranchised and the public abroad. Least in Poland, but to an increasing 
degree towards the north of the Baltics, the nobility was seen as two-fold enemies of the state 
– as social enemies, contradicting a democratic order, and as national enemies of the titular 
nationality. Land reforms, which empowered the historically oppressed peasantry, provided, 
on the one hand, an amendment of an historical injustice, and, on the other hand, an even 
distribution of land ownership and thus the basis of democracy and national empowerment. 
This, national activists argued, made the land reforms the founding charters of their 
democratic nation states. The land hunger of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish 
peasants was at the same time framed as the most pressing obstacle of the project of national 
empowerment as well as the most obvious case of social injustice that a democratic state had 
to address.  
 
While national activists argued their reforms were in line with “western” changing standards 
of property protection, their opponents – Baltic Germans in Estonia and Latvia, Poles in 
Lithuania and foreign politicians and economists supporting their cases – claimed policies of 
property redistribution in this region hardly differed from Bolshevism, thus juxtaposing them 
as “agrarian revolutions” to historical “evolutionary” policies. The expropriated had hardly 
any chance of reverting expropriations or confiscations via political institutions on the 
national level and thus had to resort to petitioning to the League of Nations. As the case of 
Alphonse von Heyking shows, minority activists accepted that minorities enjoyed only a 
limited degree of political participation within the post-war order, but insisted on respect for 
the principle of the inviolability of property – an argument contextualised in a framing of 
minority protection as the major and sole democratic principle that could contain the 
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disintegrating power of the idea of national self-determination. In this respect, these 
fundamentally contradictory assessments of the role of property for democracy – the creation 
of an even structure of property ownership versus the safeguarding of the existing, 
historically evolved property structure – largely resemble contradictions in broader debates 
on property and democracy usually attributed to the “West”. 
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